In this paper, we use call option prices to identify synergies and news from merger and acquisition (M&A) transaction announcements. We find that M&A announcements result in large and approximately equal gains to the bidder and the target on average, with the combined gains being large enough to justify the premium paid to target shareholders. On average, M&A announcements release good news about targets, but bad news about bidders. This suggests that market prices understate true synergy gains, and helps reconcile the generally negative market-based evidence on value-creation in takeovers with their continued prominence in everyday business strategy. (JEL G13, G14, G34) Financial economists have long been concerned with understanding the motives and consequences surrounding merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions: Do they create value, or simply transfer wealth between shareholders of different firms? 1 Do they communicate new information about bidders and targets that is relevant in the absence of the merger (McCardle and Viswanathan 1994; Jovanovic and Braguinsky 2004) , or do they simply reflect managerial hubris Comments and suggestions by Michael Bradley, Alexander Lyundqvist, Kasper Neilsen, Robert Whitelaw, and an anonymous referee, as well as participants at a
and other behavioral biases (Roll 1986; Malmendier and Tate 2008) ? Scores of empirical studies have set out to answer these questions, and have met with mixed success.
The standard approach to studying these questions is to use stock price reactions as direct measures of value change. The problem with this approach, however, is that stock price reactions do not cleanly identify any of the research questions posed above: they combine overpayments, synergies, news about bidder and target standalone values, and probability assessments associated with successful deal completion into a single number (Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson 2003; Bhagat et al. 2005) . If an M&A announcement reveals unfavorable information about the standalone value of the bidder, for example, the bidder returns following the merger announcement will understate the benefit of the acquisition to the bidder. Alternatively, if the announcement reveals favorable information about the target or the bidder, the combined bidder and target returns will exceed the synergies arising from the merger. Finally, the fact that the market assigns some probability of failure even to ultimately successful acquisitions means that using stock price reactions alone to estimate the market's beliefs about synergies will understate the overall gains of an M&A transaction.
In this paper, we show how call options written on bidder and target firms can be used to identify the market's beliefs about the distinct sources of value change that occur when an M&A transaction is announced. The sources of value change are the probability of takeover success, the gains to the bidder and target, and the news about the bidder and target. Just as speculators set bidder and target stock prices on the announcement day based on their assessments of the components of value change, other speculators set bidder and target call option prices based on their assessments of the same sources of value change. Like observed stock prices, observed call option prices can be written as a weighted average of call option prices if the takeover is successful or fails. But, because option prices on the bidder and the target are nonlinear functions of the underlying stock prices, each call option provides an additional unique piece of information about the takeover. With multiple call option series on both the bidder and the target, we can identify the market's beliefs about all of the sources of takeover value.
We apply our technique to a sample of 167 transactions between 1996 and 2008 in which the bidder and target had exchanged-traded stock options. We find that the market's initial beliefs about the success probability of the acquisition are a strong predictor of the ultimate outcome. When we examine percentage changes, we find that synergy gains are present on average, and that they appear to justify the offer premium paid. These synergies are shared between bidder and target firms, with targets receiving 49.4% of the total synergy gains on average and bidders receiving 50.6%. We also find that M&A announcements reveal good news about targets on average, but bad news about bidders. The evidence for dollar value changes is similar.
The ability of our approach to disentangle gains for the bidder and target in takeovers from news about their standalone values is best illustrated by comparing our results with the abnormal return and change in market value methodologies used in past studies. Computing abnormal returns and changes in market value over the 30 days preceding and including the announcement day for our sample of takeovers, we find that bidders earn a small positive abnormal return, but lose in terms of market value changes. This evidence is consistent with work by Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004, 2005) , who find that bidders incur a loss in market value on announcement, but earn a small abnormal return.Amore recent study by Bayazitova, Kahl, and Valkanov (2012) also shows that bidders tend to experience large dollar losses in market value, and that while in general bidders earn a small positive abnormal return, bidders acquiring larger targets tend to experience negative abnormal returns. Our methodology, however, isolates the synergy gains from the news component of overall bidder losses. In doing so, we show that the positive synergy gains experienced by bidders are largely offset by the revelation of bad news about the bidder.
Our paper is part of a strand of research that attempts to refine estimates of value creation based on stock price reactions. Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson (2003) develop a framework for separating the synergy, overpayment, and information effects from the overall stock price change. They identify two types of acquisitions where it is theoretically possible to disentangle the three sources of price change. The first is when there is a failed acquisition by a single bidder. The second is when there are two bidders competing for a single target and the market knows ex-ante and with certainty that one of the bidders will successfully acquire the target. For the more general case, however, they argue that it is seldom possible to isolate the three effects based on stock price reaction alone. The closest paper in this regard is probably Borochin (2010) , who builds from a similar starting point to our work but develops Bayesian methods to solve for the evolution of market beliefs, focusing in particular on Microsoft's failed attempt to acquire Yahoo. 2 Bhagat et al. (2005) develop two methods to adjust announcement returns to account for the probability of deal failure, thereby admitting a measure of the bidder/target combined value improvement associated with a transaction. Their probability scaling method inflates the stock reaction by a scaling factor that accounts for either the conditional or unconditional sample average success probability. Their intervention method uses the value change in the bidder surrounding a competing bid for a target to identify value improvements in the initial transaction. We apply Bhagat et al.'s probability scaling method to our sample to show how news about the bidder and target partially obscures true synergy gains and demonstrate how our approach overcomes this problem. This paper is structured as follows. In Section 1, we describe the problem of uncovering the components of stock price reactions following M&A announcements in more detail. We show that the problem is underidentified when using only bidder and target-firm stock prices and then we solve the identification problem by incorporating the prices of call options written on the bidder and the target. In Section 2, we describe the data and sample selection process. In Section 3, we infer the components of takeover value-gains to the bidder and target, news about the bidder and target, and total synergy gains-as well as the probability of takeover success from a cross-section of stock and stock option prices. We also address the issue of sample selection bias. Section 4 provides a summary and offers conclusions.
Determining the Sources of Takeover Value
In this section, we develop a framework for estimating the sources of takeover value. We begin, in the first part, by formulating the problem using the prices of the shares of the bidder and takeover firms. We also show that stock price information alone is generally insufficient to isolate all of the sources of value. In the second part, we solve the underidentification problem by augmenting the information set with prices of exchange-traded call options written on the shares of the bidder and the target and specifying additional equations necessary to infer the components of takeover value.
Formulating the problem using stock prices
We adopt the framework of Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson (2003) (hereafter HKR) and begin by writing the bidder's and target's stock prices as a weighted average of expected future stock prices under two scenarios. If a bidder B makes an offer for a target T at time t that will either be consummated or fail at time t +k, the current stock prices of the bidder and the target may be written as
(1) and
where B S t+k B F t+k is the price of the bidder's stock at time t +k if the merger succeeds (fails), p is the probability that the merger is successful, O t+k is the value of the offer from the bidder, which is relevant only if the offer is successful (and may be function of the bidder's stock price, B t ), and T F t+k is the value of the target if the offer fails. For simplicity, we assume that the time until the merger resolution, k, is sufficiently short so as to ignore discounting issues.
With the stock price relations so defined, the sources of value change in the acquisition may be written as follows. Let time t −1 be a time period such that at Danesh Sabz Gharn Institution on May 27, 2013 http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from no information about the merger is in the prices of B and T . The total value change accruing to the successful bidder and target is
Recognizing the possibility that the merger may fail, the total value change may also be written as
Each of the terms in parentheses in Equation (4) 
Gain to target:
The total gains from synergy are
The bidder is said to "overpay" in situations in which the gains to the target are greater than the total gains from synergy or, equivalently, the gains to the bidder are less than 0.
To isolate the four different sources of takeover value, (5a) through (5d), we have only two equations, (1) and (2), and the identification problem becomes immediately obvious. At time t, we observe only the market prices of the bidder and the target B t and T t and the value of the offer O t+k . We need to solve for the prices of the bidder's stock at time t +k if the merger succeeds B S t+k or fails B F t+k , the price of the target's stock at time t +k if the merger fails T F t+k , and the probability that the merger is successful p. While, under certain assumptions, it might be reasonable to proxy for B S t+k using a realized value, we are still left with estimating the market's beliefs at the time t of the t +k values of the two firms if the transaction fails, B F t+k and T F t+k , as well as the probability of success, p. The problem can be solved only under special circumstances. HKR, for example, focus on a special situation in which a court-ordered acquisition forces the ex-ante probability of success to be one.
Completing the problem formulation using option prices
In cases where the bidder and targets have listed options, the estimation problem becomes manageable. Because option prices are nonlinear functions of stock price, each exchange-traded option price brings additional information to the table. We begin with call options on the bidder's stock. The value of a single call option written on the bidder may be written as
where c t (B t ;X) is the observed price of a call option with exercise price, X, written on the bidder. The stock options are assumed to expire after the resolution date, but need not share the same expiration date. With these parameter estimates, we can deduce the gains to the bidder (5a) and the value of any news about the bidder as it pertains to the announcement of the takeover offer (5b), as well as the probability that the takeover will be successful, p.
To distinguish between gains to the target and news about the target, prices of exchange-traded call options on the target are used. The procedure for incorporating call prices depends on the nature of the offer. If the offer is 100% cash, O t+k = CASH t+k , then call options on the target are not necessarily required to distinguish gains to the target from news about the target. That is, if the probability of the merger being successfully completed has already been inferred using information about the bidder's stock and option prices (see above), Equation (2) can be used to infer the value of the target should the offer fail.
The gain to the target is CASH t+k −T 
Note that, if the offer is successful, the call option value equals its immediate exercise value, max(CASH t+k −X,0), because the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) revises the terms of all outstanding calls from being deliverable in the stock to being deliverable in cash. 4 If the call is in the money, immediate exercise of the call (or selling the call in the market) is optimal since deferring exercise (or sale) will mean forfeiting the interest income that could be earned on the exercise proceeds (call premium) beginning immediately. 5
In the case where the offer consists exclusively of the bidder's stock, the call options on the target provide information not only about the value of the target should the offer fail, T ;X are the theoretical values of the call conditional upon the share price and volatility of the target if the offer is successful or fails, respectively. In (9), note that, if the offer is successful, the offer price of the target is the number of shares of the bidder offered per share of the target multiplied by the bidder share price if successful, nB S t+k , and the volatility rate of the target's shares equals the volatility rate of the bidder's shares, σ S B,t+k . In this way, the effects of dilution on the bidder's shares and diversification on the bidder's volatility rate are explicitly incorporated.
Up to this point, we have focused exclusively on the prices of call options. In principle, the prices of put options on the bidder and the target could also be used in the problem formulation. 6 Around takeover events, however, this is ill-advised. Standard option valuation methods assume that market participants can short-sell stocks freely with the proceeds earning a rebate rate equal to the risk-free rate of interest. During takeovers, bidder and target stocks become difficult to short-sell (or become "special"), rebate rates fall below the risk-free rate of interest, and put prices rise above standard model values. 7
Weighting pricing errors
In implementing our model, we generally have more call option series than we require in our estimation so the system of equations is overidentified. To estimate parameter values, we assume that each pricing equation has an error term (ε i ), and we minimize the sum of squared errors across the pricing equations. The errors are assigned "delta" weights (w i 's) reflecting their relative importance in the system of equations. The estimator may be written as
where n S = 2 (i.e., the number of stocks includes only the bidder and the target), n CB is the number of call options on the bidder, and n CS is the number of call options on the target. The errors of the stock pricing equations (1) and (2) The weights applied to the errors of the call option pricing equations vary depending on their proximity to being at the money. Of the call option series, the at-the-money option provides the most incremental information about the sources of takeover: its gamma (i.e., the sensitivity of delta to stock price) and vega (i.e., the sensitive of option price to the volatility rate) are highest. The at-the-money call is defined as the call with an exercise price equal to X * = Se (r+.5σ 2 )T , where S is the stock price, r is the annualized risk-free interest, σ is the standard deviation of the stock return of the company in question, and T is the option's time to expiration expressed in years. Under standard option valuation assumptions, this particular call has a delta equal to 0.5, which becomes its pricing error weight. We weight the errors of out-of-the-money and in-the-money calls by the factor 0.5 times the ratio γ X γ * , where γ X is the gamma of the call with exercise price X and γ * is the gamma of the at-the-money call (with exercise price X * ). 8 For the n CB call options written on the bidder, for example, the terms of the summation (10) are
and contain five of the estimation parameters. Note that the at-the-money call is likely not an available exercise price; nonetheless, its gamma can be computed for purposes of computing the ratio. Note also that, as the calls become deeper and deeper in the money or out of the money, the ratio and the error weight go to zero as these options provide little incremental information in helping estimate the parameters of the model. This also mitigates concerns about implied volatility "smiles" that have been documented in stock option markets.
To mitigate concerns about the term structure of implied volatility, we use calls with a single expiration (i.e., the first expiration date after the date on which successful mergers are completed or unsuccessful mergers are withdrawn). The call option price used in the estimation procedure is the midpoint of the bid and ask price quotes at the end of the day. If either quote is zero, the call is eliminated. In summary, using call option prices on the bidder and targets provides a means of determining the sources of takeover value. Specifically, we are able to distinguish between gains to the bidder, B S t+k −B (1) and (2) T ,t+k , we use the bidder and target's share prices, as well as the prices of at least five call options (at least three calls on the bidder and two calls on the target, respectively).
Data Sources and Sample Attributes
The data for this study are drawn from a number of sources. The sample includes all U.S. domestic takeover bids with announcement dates from January 1996 through December 2008. 9 Details for each deal, including the announcement date, terms, and subsequent execution or failure, are collected from the Securities Data Company's (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database and checked against public news media releases recorded by Factiva. Stock data for bidders and targets are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily master file. The relevant fields are closing price, return, cash dividends, split factors, trading volume, and shares outstanding. Accounting data are obtained from the Compustat database. Stock option data are drawn from OptionMetrics. The file includes daily closing bid/ask quotes, trading volume, and open interest for each option series. The data are available from January 1996 forward, thus dictating the beginning date of our sample period.
The valuation of options and the computation of implied volatilities require a proxy for the risk-free rate of interest. We use the Eurodollar spot rate. One-day, seven-day, one-month, three-month, six-month, and one-year nominal rates are downloaded from Datastream and converted into continuous rates. The interest rate for a particular maturity t is computed by linearly interpolating between the two continuous rates whose maturities straddle t. We proxy for expected dividends by using the actual dividend paid over the option's life, adjusted for stock splits, and stock dividends paid during the option's life. As noted above, cash dividend, stock split, and stock dividend information for individual stocks are drawn from the CRSP daily master file.
To be included in the sample, we require that both the bidder and target have listed call options. Because of exchange guidelines in listing options, this means our sample contains larger and more active firms. The CBOE (the largest U.S. option exchange) guidelines, for example, require that a stock has a minimum of 7 million shares outstanding not including those held by insiders, and a minimum of 2,000 shareholders. In addition, they require that that stock's trading volume has been at least 2.4 million shares during the past 12 months. 10 On the announcement day, we require the prices of at least three calls on the bidder and at least two calls on the target. We also require a period of 60 trading days before the announcement to determine pre-announcement prices and return volatilities, which are used as starting values in the estimation procedure.
The initial data set from SDC consists of 31,408 observations that are coded as mergers, acquisitions, or acquisitions of majority interest. We remove observations where (a) the bidder is not seeking to own 100% of the target postacquisition; (b) the bidder, target, or offer details are not disclosed; (c) the offer is not cash or stock only; (d) the deal includes a collar or upper and lower bounds on the exchange ratio; or (e) there is an existing competing offer for the target or the bidder has multiple offers outstanding. Finally, the sample includes only consummated or withdrawn mergers; we exclude any offers where the SDC lists the status as unknown, rumored, or pending. The number of observations remaining is 10,381.
Next, we match bidders and targets from the SDC sample with the CRSP daily master file based on the CUSIP number and firm name. The first step of the process is to match SDC 6-digit CUSIPs with CUSIPs in the CRSP names file. Where both the bidder and target have matching CUSIPs, the names of the firms are then manually checked to ensure consistency. The number of matches to CRSP where CRSP had 60 days of price data prior to the takeover announcement is 1,705. Finally, SDC CUSIPs are used to match to OptionMetrics CUSIPs, and again, OptionMetrics firm names are manually checked against SDC firm names. Assuming a match, the OptionMetrics data are checked to ensure that at least three call series on the bidder and two call series on the target are available on the announcement day. The number of takeover offers satisfying all of these constraints is 167. Table 1 provides a summary of the attributes of the takeover offers in our sample. The total number of firms in the sample is 308, with 141 unique bidders and 167 unique targets. 11 As shown in Panel A, the sample consists of 90 cash offers and 77 stock offers announced April 1996 through December 2008. Of the cash offers, 85 are successful and 5 are unsuccessful. Of the stock offers, 63 are successful and 14 are unsuccessful. Takeover offers occur predominately among firms within the same industry, with 62.3% of offers occurring between firms with the same two-digit SIC code. Very few of the offers in the sample are regarded as hostile by target management, with only 3 cash offers and 6 stock offers not classified as friendly by the SDC. This is consistent with past work 10 See Chicago Board Options Exchange (2002, paragraph 2113 showing a decline of hostile mergers after the 1980s (Schwert 2000; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001) . In the takeover literature, no single standard exists for a bidder or target firm's non-informative base price. 12 Consequently, we use a range of start dates. The longest interval has a start date 60 trading days before announcement.
Sample attributes
12 Bradley (1980) , for example, uses 40 days before the announcement day, while Schwert (1996) and Betton and Eckbo (2000) use 60 days. A similar problem exists when determining abnormal returns around takeover announcements. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) compute abnormal returns over a window starting five days before the announcement and extending five days after the announcement, while
Standing nearly three months before the takeover announcement, the likelihood that the bidder and target share prices have incorporated information about the impending event is small. The shortest interval is five trading days. Here, the likelihood is much higher considering the sheer number of individuals (e.g., lawyers, accountants, financial analysts, boards of directors) involved in a takeover attempt. Finally, as a compromise between the two extremes, we also use an interval that begins 30 trading days before the announcement. While the choice of a non-informative base price may produce different abnormal returns for the bidder and target, it is important to note that the synergy gains estimated from our model do not require a non-informative base price. Turning to the offer premium results reported in Table 1 , we see that the selection of the non-informative base price does have an effect. Using the target's closing share price 30 days before the announcement day, we find that the offer premium is 37.6% on average and is higher for cash offers, 46.5%, than for stock offers, 27.0%. This cash versus stock offer result appears robust in the sense that cash offers also have higher offer premiums using base prices from 60 and 5 days before announcement. Stock offers are considerably larger than cash offers, with an average value of $4,920.4 million compared to $1,582.5 million. They also take longer to complete, with the average number of calendar days from the announcement day until the completion or withdrawal at 102.4 compared with 74.7 for cash offers.
As noted earlier, imposing the requirement that the bidder and target have exchange-traded options creates a sample of takeover offers involving firms with high market capitalization and trading volume. To examine the degree to which this happens, we compare the average market values and trading volumes of bidder and target firms in the sample with those not included in the sample in Panel B of Table 1 . The number of takeover offers for which we found matching call option data for the bidder and target is 167. The number of offers for which we could not identify matching option data is 1,538. Both bidder and target firms in our options sample are larger, have higher trading volume, and have less volatile stock prices. We account formally for the potential selection bias this induces in the regression results of Section 3. Table 2 reports the number of series, open interest, trading volume, and implied volatility for call options on the bidder and target. To compute the average number of option series, the open interest, and the trading volume figures, a three-step procedure is used. First, we sum across all call option series in Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) use a three-day window starting one day prior to announcement and ending one day after announcement. Bhagat et al. (2005) use an 11-day window from five days prior through five days post announcement, but also report cumulative abnormal returns over seven different time periods starting 90, 60, 30, 15, 10, 5, and 1 day prior to announcement, with each period extending until one day after announcement.
Call option market activity
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a given option class on a given day. 13 Second, we average across all days in each class across all days. Finally, we average across all firms. Several observations are noteworthy. First, the number of option series for both the bidder and target increases. As the stock price reacts to the takeover news, the stock option exchanges apparently introduce a wider range of exercise prices to accommodate customers who may want to speculate on extreme shortterm moves in the bidder or target share prices. For bidders, the number of call option series increases by 28.5% on the announcement day relative to the pre-announcement period, and for targets, the increase is 25.0%. Second, the customer demand for opening new call option positions is dramatic. The open interest for bidder-firm calls increases is 90.6% higher on the announcement day than it is in the pre-announcement period. For calls on the target, it is 168.4% higher. Third, and perhaps most dramatic, is the call option trading volume on the announcement day-212.3% higher for bidder call options in the pre-announcement period and 1,169.8% higher for target options. 14 Taken together, these results provide compelling evidence that call options play an important role in the price discovery process in the days surrounding a takeover announcement.
Aside from documenting increased option trading activity in the days following a takeover offer announcement, Table 2 provides average optionimplied volatilities. Daily implied volatilities are computed in the days surrounding the takeover announcement by averaging the implied volatilities of 13 An option class refers to all options written on the same underlying asset (e.g., stock). An option series refers to an option within the class and is defined uniquely by the triplet call or put, exercise price, and expiration date.
14 Cao, Chen, and Griffin (2005) examine the information content of extraordinary call option trading activity in the period before takeover announcements and find that it has predictive power for stock price movements.
individual option series in a manner so that the daily value is always at the money and has 30 calendar days remaining to expiration. For the call options written on bidder firms, the average implied volatility does not change meaningfully as a result of the merger announcement (i.e., increases from 30.8% to 31.6%). This should not be surprising since the market value of the target is only a small fraction of the bidder (i.e., about 7.2% based on the results in Panel B of Table 1 ), which means its marginal contribution to the combined firm's volatility after the takeover is small. Conversely, the target implied volatility falls dramatically on the news of the takeover attempt (i.e., from 44.3% to 27.1%). For stock offers, the reduction in volatility reflects the fact that the target implied volatility will fall to the level of the bidder implied volatility if the merger is consummated. For cash offers, the target implied volatility becomes zero if the merger is consummated. 15
Estimating the Sources of Takeover Value
With the attributes of the sample documented, we now turn to estimating the model on the announcement day for each takeover offer in our sample. The model is defined by the stock and option pricing equations (1), (2), (6), and (8) (for cash offers) or (9) (stock offers) on the announcement day of our sample of mergers. The key parameters are the bidder price if successful, B S t+k , the bidder price if unsuccessful, B F t+k , the target price if unsuccessful, T F t+k , and the probability of success, p. With reliable estimates of these parameters, we can identify the sources of takeover value. Table 3 summarizes the estimation results. Across the 167 offers in the sample, the least squares estimation performed on the announcement day includes an average of 8.9 options on the bidder and 5.7 options on the target. The average sum of squared errors is 0.197, and the mean absolute error is 0.049. Considering that call options in our sample have an average bid/ask spread of 39.3 cents (not reported in the table), the magnitude of the mean absolute deviation is small in a relative sense. The average expected probability of success across our sample is 66.4%. 16 The probability of success is higher for offers that ultimately succeed compared to those that fail, with the mean probability of a successful offer of around 69.3% compared to 44.5% for offers that later prove unsuccessful. Both point estimates are statistically different from zero and one at the 5% probability level. They are also significantly different from each other at the 5% probability level.
The cash offer and stock offer results in Table 3 offer additional insights concerning expected success probability. The cash offers are more likely to 15 See Whaley (2006, pp. 401-6) .
16 This is consistent with previous studies that use a broader subsample of takeover announcements. In Bhagat et al. (2005) , the first bidder is successful in 690 out of 1,018 takeover contests, which provides an average expected probability of success of 67.78%. In Betton and Eckbo (2000) , 864 initial bids were successful out of 1,353 contests, resulting in an average expected probability of success of 63.86%.
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succeed than stock offers, with an average expected probability of success of 79.4% compared to 51.2%. Both estimates are significantly different from zero and one at the 5% probability level. The probability of success is higher for cash offers that succeed compared to those that fail, 80.9% versus 54.7%. The difference is statistically significant and large in economic magnitude. In contrast, the market has a difficult time forecasting which stock deals will ultimately succeed and which will fail. The difference in probability is 0.128 and is insignificantly different from zero, even though there are 14 unsuccessful stock deals as opposed to only 5 unsuccessful cash deals. Table 4 contains average abnormal returns and percentage price changes. The first two rows in each panel are abnormal announcement day returns (i.e., the difference between the stock return and the CRSP value-weighted market return) from the base day through the announcement day. The remaining rows are percentage price changes computed as the ratio of the dollar price changes in Equations (5a) through (5d) to the bidder or target base price, where the base price is the closing stock price 60, 30, or 5 days earlier (i.e., Panels A through C, respectively). The percentage price change for gains to the bidder, for example, is calculated as the ratio of Equation (5a) to the bidder's base price. The percentage price change for synergy gains is defined as the weighted sum of percentage price changes for gains to the bidder and gains to the target, where the weights are the ratio of bidder and target market values, respectively, to the sum of the market value of the bidder and target. Past studies show that target-firm shareholders experience large positive returns following an M&A announcement and bidder-firm shareholders generally have negative returns. 17 Using our sample of 167 takeover offers, we find that, while targets earn significantly positive abnormal returns on average, average bidder abnormal returns depend on the choice of base price. At t −60, for example, the results reported in Panel A of Table 4 show the bidder and target earning a significantly positive average abnormal return. At t −5, on the other hand, the bidder's abnormal return is significantly negative, and at t −30, the bidder's abnormal return is positive but insignificant. In a general sense, our results are consistent with the past literature in that the bidder's returns are small relative to the target's returns independent of the choice of the base price.
Percentage price changes
Target-firm shareholders experience a positive abnormal return regardless of whether the offer is ultimately successful or not. If the offer is successful, the target realizes an average abnormal return of 29.7% on announcement using a t −30 base price. If the offer is unsuccessful, the average abnormal return is 21.3%. Both abnormal returns are significantly different from zero. Abnormal return is defined as the buy-and-hold stock return from the base day through the announcement day less the buy-and-hold return on the CRSP value-weighted index over the same period. Non-informative base prices are set to 60, 30, and 5 days before the announcement day. * indicates value is significantly different from zero at the 5% probability level.
The results are qualitatively similar using the other base prices. Cash offers produce greater abnormal returns for targets than do stock offers, 38.0% and 17.9%, respectively. Again, both abnormal returns are significant. For bidders, the abnormal returns are considerably smaller than for targets. The returns are higher for unsuccessful offers than for successful ones, independent of the base price. The returns are generally insignificant, however. The percentage price changes based on our new methodology enrich our understanding of takeovers by isolating synergy gains from the news component of bidder and target announcement returns. Based on the parameter estimates from our model, we find that both bidder and target firms gain. Across all offers in the sample, the total percentage gains from synergy are 5.9% using a t −30 base price, with the bidder realizing 3.6% (i.e., 50.6% of total) and the target 30.1% (i.e., 49.4% of total). Both bidder and target gains are significantly different from zero. Like in the case of the abnormal return results, cash offers are distinctly different from stock offers under the new methodology. The total percentage gains from synergy are 5.8% for cash offers and 6.1% for stock offers, with only gains from cash offers being significant. Also, like in the case of the abnormal return results, both the bidder and the target firms gain. For cash offers, targets gain 39.0% (i.e., 32.3% of total) and bidders gain 4.1% (i.e., 67.7% of total), although only the target gain is significantly different from zero. For stock offers, target shareholders experience a significant gain of 19.8% (i.e., 68.5% of total), while the bidder shareholders experience a gain, albeit insignificant, of 3.0% (i.e., 31.5% of total).
The percentage gains to the bidder and the target and their significance vary with the choice of base price, not because our new methodology produces different bidder and target dollar gains, but rather because the base price changes. Recall that both the dollar gain to the bidder (5a) and the dollar gain to the target (5c) are computed from parameters estimated from the model and that the model is estimated using stock and option price data from only the announcement day. Hence, the variation in the bidder and target percentage gains as well as the total percentage gains from synergy seen in Panels A through C in Table 4 is driven only by variation in the base prices. We circumvent this problem in Table 5 , where we report average dollar gains.
Before leaving Table 4 , it is worthwhile to note that our model also provides an assessment of how the takeover announcement has provided news about the bidder and the target. Panel A of Table 4 indicates that, on average, takeover announcements reveal good news about targets and bad news about bidders. For the overall sample, the news about the target using a t −30 base price is 9.7% and is significant at the 5% level. The news about the bidder is −1.3% but is insignificant. Unsuccessful offers reveal more bad news about bidders than successful offers, although the amount of news is insignificantly different from zero in both cases. Successful offers convey more news about targets than unsuccessful offers, 10.1% versus 6.4%, although only the former is significantly different from zero. Stock offers provide more news about the Table 5 Summary 
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Abnormal return is defined as the buy-and-hold stock return from the base day through the announcement day less the buy-and-hold return on the CRSP value-weighted index over the same period. Non-informative base prices are set to 60, 30, and 5 days before the announcement day. * indicates value is significantly different from zero at the 5% probability level.
target than cash offers. The average percentage changes are 12.2% and 7.5%, respectively, with both types of offers being significantly different from zero. This suggests that there is greater uncertainty surrounding the value of targets of stock offers. Stock offers reveal good news about the bidder, 2.4%, but the average percentage change is insignificant. Cash offers reveal bad news about the bidder, and the average percentage change is significantly different from zero. The results vary from panel to panel depending on the base price. While many of the interpretations of the results remain the same, others change.Absent a defensible standard of base price, robustness tests are the only solution.
Dollar value changes
The percentage change results reported in Table 4 are averages of the ratios across offers, so small takeovers are weighted as heavily as large takeovers. In order to measure value creation and destruction, we report average dollar value changes in Table 5 . Using standard announcement day methodology, we find, like in past work, that mergers are value destroying. Using a base date of t −30, for example, the average bidder loss on announcement day is $457.7 million. The bidder losses are higher at t −5 and lower at t −60; however, none of the bidder losses are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The average target gain using a t −30 base price is about the same in absolute magnitude at $465.7 million, and it is statistically significant. The average target gains using t −5 and t −60 are of the same order of magnitude and are also significantly different from zero. Using our methodology, both the bidder and the target firms gain from the takeover announcement. Across all offers in the sample, the average gain to the bidder is $796.1 million, and the average gain to the target is $402.2 million. Only the target gain is significantly different from zero. The total synergy gain is $1,198.2 million on average, but not statistically significant. Note that the estimates of bidder and target gains as well as the total gains from synergy do not vary with the choice of base price. They are computed from the parameter estimates from our model, where the model is fitted only to announcement day data. To compute news about the bidder and the target, however, we need a base price. Using a t −30 base price, news about the bidder averages -$1,319.2 million and is not significantly different from zero. In other words, bidders are expected to experience a gain from the takeover of $796.1 million; however, this gain is offset by significant bad news about the bidder of -$1,319.2 million. The news about the target is $182.1 million and is significantly different from zero.
Probability scaling method
In this section, we compare the results of our study to those that would have been obtained using the probability scaling method of Bhagat et al. (2005) . The probability scaling method is intended to overcome the problem that observed abnormal returns around a takeover event will be downwardly Hostile is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the offer is hostile or unsolicited, effective premium is the ratio of the offer price to the pre-bid target price, and relative size is the ratio of pre-bid bidder market value to pre-bid target market value. Pre-bid values are measured 60 days prior to announcement. Abnormal return is defined as the buy-and-hold stock return from the non-informative base day t −30 through the announcement day less the buy-and-hold return on the CRSP value-weighted index over the same period. Probability scaled returns are abnormal returns scaled by the probability that the target is successfully acquired, which is the sum of the probability that the first bid succeeds and the probability that a later bid succeeds. The probability that the first bid succeeds is estimated from the logit model, while the probability that a later bid succeeds is the sample average of 3.0%. * indicates value is significantly different from zero at the 5% probability level.
biased to the extent that the market expects the merger to fail. Bhagat et al. address this problem by scaling combined bidder and target abnormal returns by the probability that the target will be successfully acquired. The shortcoming of this approach is that it cannot quantify the effect of news on bidder and target standalone values. Bhaghat et al. propose an alternative approach, the intervention method, to address this shortcoming; however, this method requires an intervening event such as shareholder litigation or the arrival of a competing bid of which there are few instances in our sample. Bhagat et al. define the probability that the target is successfully acquired as the sum of the probability that the first bid succeeds and the probability that a later bid succeeds. We adopt their approach in estimating the probability that the first bid succeeds. They use a logit model where independent variables are the relative size of the bidder to target, offer premium, and a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the offer is hostile and zero otherwise. 18 The results are presented in Panel A of Table 6 . All independent variables are significant at the 5% probability level, which is consistent with the results of Bhagat et al.
Panel B of Table 6 compares the unscaled abnormal returns, news, and synergy gains reported in Table 4 to abnormal returns scaled by the probability of success. Scaled abnormal returns are higher than unscaled abnormal returns because the probability of success is less than one on average. Scaled abnormal returns reflect both synergy gains and news, so to the extent that merger announcements release positive (negative) news about the firm, scaled returns will overstate (understate) synergy gains. The results of Table 6 confirm this. When looking at scaled abnormal returns, bad news about the bidder partially obscures positive synergy gains accruing to bidding firm shareholders. Scaled bidder abnormal returns are 0.5% on average and not significantly different from zero, compared to a statistically significant synergy gain of 3.6%. The difference is because merger announcements release bad news about the bidders of −1.3% on average, although not significantly different from zero. Scaled target abnormal returns are 36.5%, which is greater than target synergy gains of 30.1%. Both gains are significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
Takeover announcements result in statistically significant good news about targets of 9.7% on average, which results in scaled abnormal returns overstating target synergy gains. Combined bidder and target scaled abnormal returns are 4.8% and significantly different from zero, but again, the overall negative news effects of merger announcements obscure the synergy gain of 5.9%. This comparison highlights the importance of the news effect on observed returns and demonstrates how our methodology allows us to isolate news from synergy gains. Bhagat et al.'s (2005) intervention method also attempts to estimate the news effect; however, their approach relies on sample averages to compute the probability of success and an intervening event such as litigation or a competing offer. Our method does not use ex-post data, and intervening events are rare in our sample. Instead, we require both the bidder and target firms to have actively traded call options. Not all firms will meet this criterion, which restricts the application of our approach to large firms. The implications of this restriction for sample selection are discussed next.
Sample selection issues
Earlier we showed that M&A announcements result in synergy gains large enough to justify the premium paid to the target-firm shareholders. This result is significant from an economic perspective because our takeover sample contains large and liquid firms by virtue of the fact that we require both the bidder and target to have actively traded options. We now turn to determining whether selection bias is a significant factor in our results. To do so, we use a two-stage Heckman (1979) approach. In the first stage, we estimate the likelihood of a firm having exchange-traded options at the time of the merger announcement with a probit regression. Then, in the second stage, we test for selection bias by regressing the probability of success, bidder and target gains, and bidder and target news against inverse Mills ratios from the first-stage regressions, along with deal and firm characteristics as control variables.
3.4.1 First-stage regressions. The probit regression model specification is based on the work of Mayhew and Mihov (2004) . Specifically, they show that stock option exchanges tend to list options on stocks that have high market capitalization, trading volume, and return volatility. To measure market value, we use the average market value over the 60 trading days before the takeover offer announcement expressed in billions of dollars. To measure trading volume, we use the average number of shares traded daily (in billions) over the same period, and, to measure return volatility, we use the standard deviation of daily log returns. Panel A of Table 7 contains the probit regression results. The results indicate that the bidders in our sample tend to have high market value and high trading volume, but have no discernible difference from other bidders in terms of return volatility. Targets, on the other hand, tend to have high trading volume and low (not high) return volatility, with no discernible difference from other targets not in our sample in terms of the market value. 19 3.4.2 Second-stage regressions. We test for selection bias in second stageregressions, where the inverse Mills ratios from the first-stage regressions are included as explanatory variables and dependent variables are probability of success, bidder and target abnormal returns, bidders and target gains, and bidder and target news, respectively. We include control variables drawn from past studies of takeover offers. They fall into two broad categories: deal characteristics and firm characteristics. Appendix B contains the specific variable definitions. Panel B of Table 7 contains the results. The rows in the panel are the coefficient estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is probability of success, bidder and target abnormal returns, total synergy gain, gains to bidder, gains to target, and bidder and target news, respectively. The columns report the coefficients for the bidder and target inverse Mills ratio, and constant, respectively. Results for deal and firm values are not reported in the interests of readability.
The results in Table 7 show that the inverse Mills ratio is significant in three cases. First, in the probability of success regression, the coefficient of the target inverse Mills ratio is negative and significant at the 5% probability level, indicating that the target firm option listing tends to be associated with a lower probability of takeover success. If sample selection results in a lower Panel A contains the results from first-stage probit regression where the dependent variable is 1 if the announcement is in our sample and 0 otherwise. Independent variables are the average firm market value over 60 days before announcement in billions of dollars, the average number of shares traded over 60 days before announcement in billions, and return volatility over 60 days before announcement. The values in parentheses are standard errors. Panel B contains the results from the second-stage regression. Abnormal return is defined as the buy-and-hold stock return from the non-informative base day t −30 through the announcement day less the buy-and-hold return on the CRSP value-weighted index over the same period. * indicates that a value is significantly different from zero at the 5% probability level.
probability of success for these mergers, this suggests that mergers with smaller targets have a greater likelihood of success than those in our sample. Second, in the target gain regression, the coefficient on the bidder inverse Mills ratio is negative and significant, indicating that mergers where bidding firms have listed options are associated with lower target gains, suggesting that bidders pay less, or alternatively, targets capture more of the overall synergy gains in mergers where the bidder is smaller. Finally, the coefficient on the bidder inverse Mills ratio is negative and significant in the synergy gain regression, which follows from the negative and significant relation between target gains and the bidder inverse Mills ratio. Again, this indicates that mergers where bidding firms have listed options will tend to experience lower total synergy gains. Overall, the results indicate that our sample is subject to sample selection biases; however, since the selection bias tends to understate the synergy gains, this does not detract from our main conclusion that M&A announcements result in synergies large enough to justify the premiums paid.
Summary and Conclusion
Stock price reactions to M&A announcements reflect the market's belief about three distinct pieces of information. First, the announcement reveals new information about the standalone values of the firms involved. The value of the bid reflects the bidder's assessment of the target's value, and in making a bid, the bidder conveys information about its own value. Second, the stock price reaction to an M&A announcement reflects the market's assessment of potential synergies arising from the business transaction, and third, the stock price reaction will reflect the market's assessment of how these gains will be split between the bidder and target shareholders. In this paper, we show this information can be extracted from the prices of call options traded on the bidder and target. Our sample consists of 167 uncontested all cash and all stock offers over the period April 1996 through December 2008. We show that, for the sample as a whole, the market's expectation of the probability of success is 66.4% on announcement. Consistent with earlier studies, we find that mergers are expected to provide positive gains, with overall gains from synergy as a percentage of bidder plus target value being 5.9% on the announcement day. These synergies are split evenly between bidders and targets, with bidders earning 50.6% of the total percentage gain on average and targets earning 49.4%. We also find that M&A announcements reveal good news about targets on average, but no news about bidders.
The results of our analysis illustrate the difficulty with using observed market prices for inferring motives and value changes in acquisitions. The fact that market prices understate the true synergy gains helps us reconcile the generally negative market-based evidence on value-creation in takeovers with their continued prominence in everyday business strategy. Our research design necessarily limits our analysis to large, liquidly traded bidders and targets, but our findings suggest that further work in this area is important for sharpening the conclusions that we draw from market-based data. 
where B S t+k B F t+k is the price of the bidder's stock at time t +k if the merger succeeds (fails), p 1 (p 2 ) is the probability that the first (second) offer is successful, O 1,t+k (O 2,t+k ) is the value of the first (second), which is relevant only if the offer is successful, and T F t+k is the value of the target if both offers fail.
The prices of exchange-traded options written on the bidder may be written as 
